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Abstract 
Why junior ministers? What function do they serve? Two explanations dominate the 
literature. Both focus on the role of junior ministers in coalition formation and coali-
tion management. One approach sees junior ministers as instruments for controlling 
policy, the other as a means to solve or ease distributive conflict among coalition part-
ners. As of yet, the literature lacks a discussion about when the two interpretations 
lead to similar empirical predictions and when they lead to different ones. The paper 
claims that different patterns of portfolio distribution can inform us about the under-
lying policy or office motives of the partners of a coalition government. Analyzing a 
rich data set on 11 countries from 1949 to 2004, the paper identifies a group of coun-
tries in which portfolio allocation shared a pattern best explained by office-seeking 
behavior, whereas in another group of countries portfolio allocation is better ex-
plained as the result of policy-seeking behavior. 
Zusammenfassung 
Was ist die Rolle von Juniorministern in Koalitionsregierungen? Insbesondere zwei 
Interpretationen finden sich in der Literatur, ohne dass bisher diese Deutungen zu-
einander in Beziehung gesetzt und auf übereinstimmende oder differierende Vorher-
sagen überprüft worden wären. Der erste Erklärungsansatz sieht Juniorminister als 
Mittel der Policy-Kontrolle und verweist auf das häufige Muster parteipolitisch wech-
selseitiger Besetzung von Minister- und Juniorminister- oder Staatssekretärposten. 
Innerhalb von Koalitionsregierungen haben Juniorminister der einen Partei dann die 
Aufgabe, die Ministerin einer anderen Partei zu überwachen. Der zweite Ansatz sieht 
diese Regierungspositionen weitgehend ohne eigenständige Policy-Funktion lediglich 
als Verteilungsmasse bei der Aufteilung politischer Pfründen zwischen Partnern einer 
Koalition. In dem Papier wird der Bereich identifiziert, in dem beide Erklärungsansät-
ze zu unterschiedlichen empirischen Vorhersagen kommen. Die Überprüfung dieser 
Hypothesen an einem großen Datensatz über Koalitionsregierungen in 11 Ländern 
von 1949 bis 2004 identifiziert eine Gruppe von Ländern, in denen die Parteien tat-
sächlich eher „postenorientiert“ handeln, während in einer anderen Gruppe von Län-
dern Parteien offensichtlich eher „policy-orientiert“ sind. 
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[Of] the things that the (coalition) theories set out to explain, it is only the distribution of payoffs 
among members that provides us with any information about the validity of the assumptions 
upon which the theories were built in the first place.  (Laver/Schofield 1990: 165) 
1 Introduction 
Why junior ministers? What function do they serve? It would seem that the answer to 
this question very much depends on the theoretical approach applied. Two explana-
tions dominate the literature. Both focus on the role of junior ministers in coalition 
formation and coalition management. One approach sees junior ministers as instru-
ments for controlling policy, the other as a means to solve or ease distributive conflict 
among coalition partners. In a coalition, parties have either to abdicate responsibility 
for certain policy domains to their coalition partner (‘ministerial government’, Laver/
Shepsle 1990, 1994, 1996) or ‘incur costs’ by losing ministerial portfolios to other par-
ties, that is suffer from reduced office payoffs (Mershon 1996: 538, 2001). Both ap-
proaches claim that junior ministers compensate for loss in either the policy or the 
office dimension. Thies (2001) interprets junior ministers or undersecretaries as in-
struments for ‘keeping tabs on partners’ within government coalitions. In his view, 
junior ministers are instruments of policy control. They fulfill watchdog functions. A 
coalition which has to agree on a joint government program for the legislative term 
can use the allocation of ministerial portfolios as a self-commitment device. Once 
ministerial posts are allocated among the government parties, ministers implement 
their ideal policy: This safeguards a coalition from the ever-present danger of post-
contract opportunism and chaotic voting cycles. Yet, a coalition will realize Pareto-
superior solutions if policy abdication is not complete, but counteracted by checks or 
tabs on partners. Monitoring can work via parliament (Martin/Vanberg 2004), but 
also through undersecretaries/ junior ministers. A party does not need to completely 
lose control over a policy sector if it can maintain partial influence by placing a junior 
minister of its choosing in a ministry led by its coalition partner (contre minister). 
Mershon (1996, 2001, 2002), in contrast, interprets junior ministers primarily as in-
struments for lowering the office costs for coalition parties. A party which shares 
power with other parties in a coalition has also to share the spoils of power with them. 
According to this view, undersecretaries are created to inflate the number of distribut-
able positions to make the office loss less hurtful. Specifically, a bigger coalition party 
that has sacrificed ‘too many’ portfolios to smaller coalition partners can be compen-
sated with undersecretaries (see below). 
                                                        
We thank Steffen Ganghof, Bernhard Kittel and Simona Piattoni for helpful comments. 
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Who is right? Unfortunately, both approaches cite the same empirical evidence in 
support of their competing hypotheses. For instance, Thies interprets each case in 
which a junior minister of party A ‘shadows’ a minister of party B as support for his 
policy control or managed delegation hypothesis. Yet, some shadowing might be sim-
ply due to the fact that party A has a number of undersecretaries/ junior ministers 
much larger than its number of ministerial portfolios. This would make some cross-
party matching between ministers and undersecretaries inevitable if the party does not 
want to staff one of its own ministries with three, four or more of its own undersecre-
taries.1 For example in Italy, where the Democrazia Cristiana maintained on average 
15 ministers and almost the double number of undersecretaries (29) in all postwar 
coalition governments, shadowing might have often been more of a side-effect of of-
fice compensation games than an indication of policy control motives. At the same 
time the large surplus of undersecretaries for larger parties is exactly the predicted 
outcome of the ‘office cost’ argument as put forward by Mershon. She explains the 
large number of DC undersecretaries as a compensation for the relative costs that a 
hegemonic party like the Democrazia Cristiana has to incur if it takes smaller parties 
on board, given that smaller parties regularly can claim hold over more ministerial 
positions than a ‘fair rule’ of proportionality, namely their strength in seats, would 
suggest (cf. Hine 1993: 106, Table 3.4; Schofield/Laver 1985, 1990; Browne/Franklin 
1973). 
Obviously, we are confronted with a problem of observational equivalence. But can 
we disentangle policy from office motives in the use of JMs? In this paper we claim 
that it is not the extent of cross-party shadowing between senior and junior ministers, 
but the distributional impact of JM positions that provides us with critical informa-
tion about the relative importance of office and policy motives.2 Crucial for our ar-
gument is the extent to which junior ministers alter or do not alter the distribution of 
government posts among coalition partners. We distinguish two stylized scenarios. In 
the first scenario, policy-oriented parties engage in tough bargaining over the distribu-
tion of senior ministerial positions since these critically secure policy influence. In this 
scenario the relative political strength of the parties – measured as their parliamentary 
                                                        
1 Thies controls for cases in which a ministry could not have been ‘shadowed’ because coalition 
partners had already ‘used up’ all of their junior ministers (Thies 2001: 589–590). Yet, he does 
not control for the opposite case in which a party has more JMs than ministers and therefore 
cannot avoid shadowing another party’s minister if it does not want to have two or more of its 
own JMs in the same ministry. In our view, this biases his findings in favor of his policy con-
trol hypothesis. 
2 With respect to the distinction between policy and office motives we follow Budge/Laver 
(1985), Strøm/Müller (1999) and others who distinguish between parties that value office in-
strumentally, as an instrument for influencing policy, and parties that value office intrinsically, 
in and for itself. The crucial question then is whether a party’s behavior is “aimed at increas-
ing the party’s control of executive office benefits … even if it means sacrificing policy objec-
tives” (Strøm/Müller 1999: 6; italics added; see also Laver/Hunt 1992). 
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seat share – is a good predictor of the bargaining outcome, that is of the distribution 
of senior ministries among the coalition members. Junior ministers are subsequently 
used to monitor those ministries whose loss to other parties could not have been 
avoided. Since in this context junior ministers are not used with the aim of compen-
sating for office loss, but for policy loss, we would not expect them to significantly 
alter the overall distributive picture; in some cases they may even aggravate the dis-
proportional allocation of posts among coalition members. In a second scenario, pri-
marily office-oriented parties allow larger deviations from a ‘fair’ distribution of minis-
terial positions, again measured against their relative seat share, since they anticipate 
being compensated for by JMs. In this case relative bargaining strength is not as good 
a predictor of portfolio allocation. Junior ministers in this case have clear ‘office loss 
compensation’ functions and therefore we expect them to bring a more dispropor-
tional distribution of senior government positions more closely into line with ‘pro-
portionality.’ In other words, in this scenario we expect both larger ‘initial’ deviations 
from a close seat strength/senior office share correspondence and a significant correc-
tive impact of junior ministers that brings the parties’ office share closer to propor-
tionality (for more details of our argument see section 2). 
We therefore claim that large deviations from proportionality with respect to senior 
positions and strong ‘corrections’ through junior ministers should be positively 
linked. We demonstrate empirically below that the data do indeed confirm our expec-
tations. Once the theoretically postulated nexus between deviation and compensation 
has been shown to exist, we can use it to assess on a country-to-country basis whether 
the distributional pattern in the allocation of senior and junior positions resembles 
more our policy-driven scenario 1 (small deviations, small compensations) or rather 
our office-driven scenario 2 (large deviations, strong compensations). Together with 
additional information about the overall size of the government and the ‘elasticity’ 
with which cabinet size reacts to changes in coalition size we then can assess the rela-
tive importance of policy-seeking versus that of office-seeking behavior in coalition 
formation in Western democracies. In a last step we validate our interpretation with 
results from an expert survey conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992) in which country 
experts were asked to assess how much parties value office gains over policy objec-
tives. The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we will spell out our central argu-
ment in more detail. In section 3 we will present and analyze our data. Section 4 con-
cludes. 
2 Policy- and office-driven patterns of portfolio allocation 
For various reasons the allocation of ministerial positions never exactly mirrors the 
respective seat share of members of a coalition, although ‘relative seat share’ is by far 
the single best predictor of the distribution of government posts among coalition par-
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ties (Gamson 1961; Browne/Franklin 1973). One trivial reason for non-proportion-
ality is the limited number of government positions that can be distributed. Public 
posts are a limited resource. Often the number of ministries cannot be expanded – at 
least not without incurring substantial political costs. In fact, where expansion is rela-
tively easy, this itself is a good indicator of the office orientation of political parties. 
Hence, the correlation between changes in cabinet size (# of posts) and changes in 
coalition size (# of parties) in a given country should provide us with our first valuable 
information about the strength of office considerations (see section 3). 
But even where politicians have much leeway and are very creative in inventing new 
governmental tasks and in establishing new ministries, junior ministers are usually 
needed for distributional fine-tuning. Where the number of cabinet posts is finite, an 
exact correspondence between election results and the distribution of government 
positions already reaches arithmetical limits. To guarantee a perfect match, a govern-
ment would need to create as many distributable government positions as there are 
parliamentary seats of the governing parties. Therefore, some degree of non-propor-
tionality is inevitable given the ‘lumpiness’ of office payoffs. But given that non-pro-
portionality usually is non-randomly distributed among the members of a coalition, 
more than a simple arithmetical problem is involved here. A frequent finding in the 
literature is that especially smaller parties tend to be over-represented with respect to 
ministerial positions (Browne/Franklin 1973). 
Systematic over-representation of small parties might be due to the fact that they oc-
cupy pivotal positions between bigger parties on the left and the right more often. 
Over-representation would then indicate that small parties have successfully ‘cashed 
in’ their privileged bargaining situation in the form of high office benefits (Browne/
Franklin 1973; Schofield/Laver 1985).3 Or over-representation may have primarily an 
arithmetic cause: every coalition party will insist on government representation 
through at least one minister. Thus if we assume a cabinet size of 14 ministers, a small 
party with one minister but less than 7% of all government parties’ seats would be 
over-represented. Finally, the over-representation of small parties may in some cases 
also be the simple expression of ethnic-linguistic fractionalization in a country, if it is 
seen as crucial that national minorities are represented in the federal government. The 
participation of the Swedish Party in every Finnish post-war government would be a 
case in point. 
Whichever of these accounts best explains the distributive patterns in coalition gov-
ernments is an empirical question that we will take up in the following section. Here 
we only want to highlight two relatively stable findings in the literature on portfolio 
allocation in coalition governments. First, the relative seat share of a coalition party is 
the single best predictor of its relative share of government positions (Gamson 1961; 
                                                        
3 Schofield/Laver (1985) could not find much evidence in support of this thesis, though. 
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Browne/Franklin 1973). Second, deviations from this ‘Gamson prediction’ have been 
non-random, favoring systematically smaller coalition parties over larger ones (cf. 
Laver/Franklin 1990: 172). We start from these findings but, given that they were 
derived from studies that have exclusively focused on ministers and failed to take into 
account junior ministers, we may – as a first step – ask whether they survive once we 
broaden our data base and include JMs in our analysis. If junior ministers are ‘distri-
butional correctives,’ as Carol Mershon and others have claimed, then non-propor-
tionality should be significantly reduced or should even completely vanish as soon as 
we take a more complete view on the pool of distributable government positions. 
However, as we will show in the following section 3, non-proportionality is not ‘ex-
plained away’ by taking into account the wider pool of top government jobs over 
which coalition parties have command. 
In the light of our argument this is not very surprising, given that it leads us to expect 
a significant reduction of non-proportionality through JMs only in those cases in 
which JMs have been used to compensate for ‘office loss,’ whereas junior ministers 
might even aggravate non-proportionality in the allocation of portfolios if they are 
used to compensate for policy loss. This refers us back to the argument already briefly 
outlined in the introduction of when exactly the distributional impact of junior min-
isters provides us with information on the underlying policy-seeking or office-seeking 
motives of political parties. It is to this question that we now turn in some more detail. 
In both the office-reward and policy-control explanations, parties incur a loss when-
ever they form a coalition. According to the ministerial government argument, they 
incur policy loss (Laver/Shepsle 1990, 1994, 1996); according to a broad strand in 
coalition theory going back to Riker (1962), they incur primarily office loss (cf. Mer-
shon 1996, 2002). Both approaches interpret junior ministers as a – partial – compen-
sation. Whereas both approaches predict largely identical outcomes for some aspects 
of portfolio allocation (e.g. the shadowing of senior ministers; see above), they have 
different observational implications in other respects. We claim that this allows us to 
empirically disentangle policy from office motives – at least partially. Our argument 
might be demonstrated best with the help of Figure 1 in which we analyze the case of a 
party’s over-representation. Needless to say, since each over-representation of party A 
is matched by under-representation of its coalition partner(s) party B (or parties B, C, 
D …), the argument could just as well have been exemplified by the opposite case of 
under-representation. The x-axis reports the seat share of a party, the y-axis its office 
share. The ‘Gamson line’ is the line of perfect proportionality between both. We ask to 
what extent junior ministers are used to bring deviations from proportionality in the 
distribution of ministries back ‘into line.’ We claim that whenever both deviation and 
compensation are comparatively large, parties are primarily oriented by office, not 
policy, motives. Put differently, if parties are more driven by policy control motives, 
they should not allow for large deviations from proportionality and junior ministers 
should not then be used as a corrective device for an unequal distribution of senior 
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government positions. That is to say, junior ministers should not alter significantly the 
overall distributive picture. 
Our substantial argument is based on the insight that a high degree of non-propor-
tionality in the distribution of ministerial portfolios (a high D1), which is corrected 
through JMs (a high CI), reveals a willingness to trade losses in the allocation of senior 
ministers for gains in the allocation of JMs. But this means that parties trade the right 
to initiate legislation, which is usually the prerogative of senior ministers, for the right 
to monitor legislative initiatives by another party or other parties, which is the func-
tion of junior ministers. To put it pointedly: ‘policy dictators’ (Laver/Shepsle) are 
traded for ‘watchdogs’ (Thies). Obviously, different items are exchanged not only with 
respect to status and hierarchy, but also in terms of policy influence (cf. Laver/Shepsle 
1994). In modern parliamentary democracies it is usually the minister who sets the 
political agenda, who moves first and initiates legislation. Even if junior ministers can 
block certain policies by alerting their party to ‘hostile’ projects of its coalition part-
ner, they themselves do not usually have the right of legislative initiative. Where they 
do, this by itself provides us with an important bit of information about the role that 
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JMs play in coalition government. For our analysis we have excluded all cases from 
the data set in which junior ministers possess the right of legislative initiative like the 
French ministres délegués, the Swedish konsultativ statsråde or the Finnish deputy or 
sub-ministers.4 For all other cases we feel safe to take the willingness to accept com-
pensations in the form of junior ministers as an indication of office-seeking behavior 
exactly in the sense of the definition given by Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang Müller, who 
define office-seeking behavior as being “aimed at increasing the party’s control of 
executive office benefits … even if it means sacrificing policy objectives” (Strøm/Müller 
1999: 6; italics added). 
An observational implication of our argument is that large deviations from the Gam-
son line in the distribution of ministerial portfolios and large compensations through 
the allocation of JMs among members of a coalition should be positively linked. We 
would also expect deviations-cum-compensations, interpreted as an indication of the 
importance of office motives, to correlate positively with the ‘elasticity’ with which 
cabinet size reacts to changes in coalition size (# of parties in government). Why do 
we treat the responsiveness of cabinet size to numbers of parties within the govern-
ment as an indication of office orientation? The underlying argument is as follows. 
The range of government tasks and activities does not vary fundamentally between the 
Western democracies and mature industrialized countries. Against the background of 
a more or less fixed range of state responsibilities, the proliferation of ministerial port-
folios is likely to lead merely to jurisdictional overlap, ill-defined responsibilities, mu-
tual blockage etc. Coordination and information costs increase exponentially with 
every additional ministry. In other words, to increase the number of portfolios often 
means to decrease policy efficiency. And these are costs to be paid by all coalition par-
ties. Again, anecdotal evidence is provided by the Italian case, in which the almost 
uncontrolled growth of government positions led to what students of Italian politics 
describe as “multidirectional disconnected government” – read: chaos (Cheli, quoted 
from Mershon 2002: 37; Golden 2003). Therefore, we feel safe to interpret the will-
ingness of coalition parties to flexibly adjust the number of distributable government 
positions to the number of government parties as an indication of office-seeking be-
havior. This seems straightforward since the overall negative impact on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government policy again clearly refers to the critical criterion for 
office-seeking behavior: maximizing executive office benefits ‘even if it means sacrific-
ing policy objectives’ (see Strøm/Müller above). 
To sum up the argument: we follow Laver and Schofield’s general suggestion to ex-
tract from the “distribution of payoffs among members” of a coalition government 
                                                        
4 A Swedish konsultativ statsråd, a Finnish deputy minister, an Australian assistant minister and 
a French ministre délégué all have their own right to initiate legislation. We therefore excluded 
them from our analysis. We included Swedish statssekreterare, who play a role comparable to a 
parliamentary secretary in Germany (see Bergman 2000; svenska statskalender, various years). 
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“information about the validity of the assumptions” of current strands of coalition 
theory (Laver/Schofield 1990: 165). In this respect we identify two patterns of portfo-
lio allocation. In the one, the office-driven pattern, we expect a comparatively loose 
(but still significant) nexus between parties’ seat strength and their respective office 
shares. This relation should become considerably closer once we include in our analy-
sis the positions on the second hierarchical layer of democratic government, the sotto-
segretari (Italy), statssekreterare (Sweden), statssekretærer (Norway), parlamentarische 
Staatssekretäre (Germany), junior, deputy or assistant ministers etc. As another charac-
teristic of the office-driven pattern we also expect the total number of top government 
positions to co-vary with the number of governing parties. In the policy-driven pat-
tern, in contrast, we expect the allocation of senior posts to follow the parties’ relative 
seat strength more closely. In other words, deviations from the Gamson line should be 
smaller. The corrective impact of JMs should also be much smaller, absent or even 
negative in this instance. Where junior ministers are used as checks on the other par-
ties within the coalition, they might even increase the degree of non-proportionality 
realized with a given allocation of ministerial portfolios. Here we also expect the 
number of political appointees not to vary strongly with coalition size. In the follow-
ing section we will present our data and test our hypotheses. 
3 Data and evidence 
Solid comparative information on junior ministers in coalition cabinets is still aston-
ishingly rare. While recent comparative data collections on portfolio allocation in-
clude a large number of countries, they typically focus solely (Woldendorp/Keman et 
al. 2000) or mainly (the data yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research 
or Keesing’s contemporary archive, for example) on senior ministers. The data that 
Carol Mershon reports (2000, Annex) includes information on the number of junior 
ministers, but provides no information about their party affiliation. Thies’s (2001) 
analysis is based on a relatively small data set containing information on multi-party 
government in Germany and Italy plus data on multi-factional government in Japan. 
One laudable effort to collect systematic data on state secretaries has recently been 
made by Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm (Müller/Strøm 2000). We build on their 
work and have complemented5 and extended the data that was collected in their pro-
ject. 
                                                        
5 The table on the Netherlands in Müller/Strøm (2000) does not provide information on junior 
ministers that have the same party affiliation as the respective senior minister. The data for 
Ireland, Norway and Luxembourg was found to lack some junior ministers. We cover a longer 
time period from 1949 to the latest available information for 2004. This has enabled us to 
gather information on about 60 additional cabinets and 2 more countries compared to the 
Müller/Strøm data. 
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Combining a rich variety of sources,6 we were able to construct a dataset on portfolio 
allocation containing information on both senior and junior ministers in coalition 
and single-party cabinets. Our sample includes 14 countries mainly from 1945 up to 
the latest available information.7 We conceive the holding of government posts as the 
defining criterion for membership in government. We follow Woldendorp et al. and 
discriminate between governments in the following manner: A government is treated 
as a new ‘case’ in our dataset if an election has taken place, if the prime minister or the 
party composition of the government has changed and if the previous government has 
resigned8 (Woldendorp/Keman et al. 2000: 10). This translates into information on 
249 coalition cabinets. Data on junior minister allocation was available for 698 parties 
in 215 coalition governments in 11 countries. This adds up to an – as far as we know – 
unprecedentedly large dataset with comparative information on the allocation of top 
government positions including junior ministers. 
We counted ministers instead of portfolios or posts, since it is not clear how to dis-
criminate between individual tasks in the event of one minister assuming multiple 
functions.9 In order to avoid double counting when ministers hold multiple posts we 
only recorded the highest status of these persons. Table 1 compares our data set to the 
data sets previously used in the literature. 
On this broad basis we can, as a first step, confirm two findings that were emphasized 
in the existing studies on portfolio allocation in coalition governments (see Table 2). 
First, the relative seat strength of a party is a good predictor of its relative office share. 
Second, as the negative coefficient in column two of Table 2 shows, larger parties are 
less likely to be over-represented when it comes to the distribution of office spoils or, 
put differently, small parties tend to receive a larger share of government positions 
than their seat strength would suggest. 
                                                        
6 For data sources, see appendix.  
7 The 14 countries included in our dataset are Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Austra-
lia. In the case of Belgium we integrated the data for the regional splittings of the Christian 
democratic, Liberal and Socialist parties in order not to artificially inflate the number of ob-
servations. For our analysis Denmark drops out completely, since the position of a junior 
minister or a state secretary is not known to the Danish political system. We decided not to 
count Finnish sub-ministers either, given that they have the power to initiate legislation them-
selves. Before 1987 Australian assisting ministers also held another portfolio as senior minis-
ter. Excluding these cases leaves such a small N that we also decided to drop the Australian 
case. Therefore the number of countries that we analyze is reduced to 11. 
8 We excluded cabinets that existed less than 35 days, since these interim cabinets would bias 
our results in an unjustifiable way. 
9 We included all nominations that took place in the first six weeks of the governing period, 
given that in many cases not all ministers of a new government were immediately nominated. 
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This leads to three subsequent questions. First, does this pattern change substantially 
once we enhance the analysis to include junior positions in government? Secondly, is 
the more frequent over-representation of small parties due to the fact that more often 
than not they occupy a pivotal bargaining position? Thirdly, is cabinet size an explan-
atory variable, since one could hypothesize that, as more parties gather around the 
cabinet table, a higher number of small parties seek ministerial representation and the 
overall portfolio allocation becomes less proportional? As Table 3 shows, assumptions 
2 and 3 do indeed find some justification in the data. Shapley values as well as the 
variable ‘coalition size’ have some explanatory power. Yet, explained variance as well 
as the coefficients for parties’ seat share remain largely unaltered once we include JMs 
in our analysis. In others words, the conventional picture that previous studies on 
portfolio allocation produced does not change dramatically once we take junior min-
isters into account.10 
                                                        
10 An implicit assumption of our analysis as well as of previous studies is that parties weight all 
ministries more or less equally. Obviously, this is a simplification and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that parties do indeed make fine distinctions (see the role that the so-called Manuale 
Cencelli has played in Italian coalition formation). We must leave it to future analyses to look 
into the pattern that emerges once we drop this assumption. The national rank orders of min-
isterial ‘status’ reported in Laver/Hunt (1992) can provide valuable information for such an 
analysis. 
Table 1 Empirical studies on portfolio allocation 
  Coalition governments 
Coalition governments with  
junior ministers 
Study  Time period Coalitions Countries Coalitions Countries 
Browne /Franklin 1973 1945–1969 114 13 … … 
Shofield /Laver 1985 1945–1982 134 12 … … 
Müller / Strøm 2000 1945–1999 238 13 154 9 
Mershon 1945–1995 214 10 129 9 
Thies 2001 ~1966–1996 68  3 68 3 
Our data 1945–2004 249 14 215 11 
Table 2 Disproportionality of cabinet allocation – correlation coefficients 
  Cabinet share (senior ministers) Over-representation (senior ministers) 
Government seats 0.931 
−0.4716 
N [parties]  698  698 
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This leads us to investigate the national patterns in the distribution of senior and jun-
ior government positions, since our argument suggests that the distributional impact 
of JMs depends on the junior ministers’ functions, i.e. we claim that parties’ underly-
ing motives on the basis of which they came to agree on a given distribution of senior 
and junior positions matter. Our argument implies two things: systematic positive 
correlation between deviations (D1) and compensations (CI), and significant variance 
between countries. Figure 2 shows that both assumptions hold true for the 11 coun-
tries of our sample (see Figure 2). 
Table 3 Explanations of cabinet allocation 
 Cabinet share 
(senior ministers) 
Cabinet share 
(senior ministers) 
Cabinet share 
(all posts) 
Cabinet share 
(all posts) 
Government seats  .827***  .744*** .841*** .756*** 
  (0.012)  (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) 
Shapley –  6.051* – 6.860* 
   (2.894)  (2.822) 
Coalition size –  −2.212*** – −2.034*** 
   (0.292)  (0.284) 
Intercept  5.934***  14.794*** 5.451*** 13.594*** 
  (0.519)  (1.273) (0.504)  (1.242) 
N [parties]  698  698 698 698 
R²  0.87  0.88  0.88  0.89 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two tailed. 
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We do indeed observe a clear, systematic and positive correlation between deviations 
from the Gamson line in the allocation of ministerial portfolios (D1) and compensa-
tions through the allocation of junior ministers (CI). Furthermore, we can also observe 
substantial variance between the countries in our sample. As Figure 2 shows, there is a 
group of countries that allow for quite large deviations from the principle of propor-
tionality with respect to ministerial portfolios, namely France, Italy and Portugal. Sec-
ondly, it is especially in these countries that junior ministers significantly reduce total 
non-proportionality. Other countries in which JMs correct for deviations from the 
Gamson line, albeit on a much lower level of overall non-proportionality, are Belgium 
and Germany. In all the other countries we either can detect no significant distribu-
tional effect of junior ministers or even an effect of increasing deviations from perfect 
proportionality. The last group includes Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria. 
In the next step of our analysis we would like to investigate whether ‘enlarging the 
cake’ by generating additional distributable positions is a frequent strategy in coalition 
formation. As a first take on this issue we may ask to what extent the average size of 
cabinets varies between countries. Figure 3 supports our assumption that the size of 
governments, if we only consider senior positions, does not differ much between the 
established Western democracies, and the variation that does exist seems to be driven 
largely by country size. Yet, once we take junior ministers into account, the cross-
country variation increases significantly and one outlier is clearly identifiable: Italy 
(see Figure 3). 
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But how much is government size driven by the number of parties in government? 
We report in Table 4 a simple correlation between ‘changes in the number of gov-
ernment parties’ and ‘changes in the number of government positions.’ The first coef-
ficient includes only senior ministers, the second coefficient takes account of both 
senior and junior positions. 
As can be seen from Table 4, only in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany do 
we find a positive and significant coefficient, with the size effect being manifestly 
strongest in Belgium and Italy. We take this as further evidence for the dominance of 
office motives in coalition formation in these countries. Note that there is consider-
able overlap in the group of countries that allow for large deviations from proportion-
ality in the allocation of ministerial posts and countries that reveal a high propensity 
to adjust the number of distributable positions to the number of parties in govern-
ment. 
Summarizing our findings we can identify a cluster of countries in which all our evi-
dence testifies to a strong influence of office motives in coalition formation (Italy, 
Belgium, France and, to some extent, Portugal) and countries in which policy motives 
clearly seem to dominate (Sweden, Luxembourg and, less clearly, Norway). We may 
also count Finland among this latter group of countries given that in Finland the insti-
tutional rules and the ‘job description’ for JMs already make it clear that they serve 
predominantly policy objectives (see also Nousiainen 1994). The same holds true for 
Australian assistant ministers. In between is a group of countries (Germany, Nether-
lands, Austria) for which we found mixed evidence. Here both office and policy-
seeking behavior seem to have some importance. 
Table 4 Inventing new portfolios? A correlation between change of government size  
 and change in the number of coalition parties 
% Change of cabinet size 
∆ # Government parties 
Cabinetsa 
N Senior posts All posts 
Sweden 25 −0.0803 −0.3054 
Norway 25 0.2855 −0.1291 
Belgium 35 0.7566*** 0.7473*** 
Netherlands 21 0.4277* 0.6142*** 
Luxembourg 17 0.4054 0.2075 
France 42 0.2564 0.1389 
Italy 50 0.6368*** 0.6383*** 
Portugal 9 −0.0726 0.4717 
Germany 18 0.4789** 0.5989*** 
Austria 20 0.2072 0.3342 
Ireland 20 0.3544 0.3078 
Total 282 0.3712*** 0.3064*** 
a Since we included one-party governments, our N in Table 4 is greater than that reported in Table 1.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; two tailed. 
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This assessment finds itself in broad agreement with the country literature, but for 
further validation of our findings we can compare them with the results that the ex-
pert survey of Laver/Hunt (1992) generated when country specialists responded to 
their question (19): “Are cabinet portfolios valued more as rewards of office or as 
means to affect policy?” (cf. Laver/Hunt 1992: 125). In order to do this, we derived an 
indicator from our empirical results which captures the relative importance of office-
seeking behavior. We took the country averages for initial deviations from the Gam-
son line (D1), for the corrective impact of junior ministers (CI), for ‘office elasticity’ 
and for total cabinet size, z-standardized these averages and summed them up. A sim-
ple correlation between our indicator and the Laver/Hunt index produces a correla-
tion coefficient of .55. Once we exclude Luxembourg, for which we have good reasons 
to assume that non-proportionality is primarily caused by small country and cabinet 
size, this coefficient increases to .61. Figure 4 shows the scatter plot. 
This positive external validation of our argument finally allows us to return to the one 
particularly contentious case that already figured prominently in the introduction to 
this article – the case of Italy. Both Michael Thies and Carol Mershon have claimed 
that the Italian example provides supporting evidence for their ‘managed delegation’ 
or ‘costs of coalition’ thesis, respectively. According to our findings, all evidence sug-
gests that Italian junior ministers are rather ‘chips’ in the game of office allocation 
than watchdogs that are installed in ‘hostile’ ministries to monitor their seniors. 
 
Manow, Zorn: Office versus Policy Motives in Portfolio Allocation 19 
Cross-party ‘shadowing’ in the Italian case is obviously a side effect of distributional 
games between coalition parties rather than the result of parties’ policy control mo-
tives. In this respect our findings are in broad agreement with the country literature, 
which emphasizes – in contrast to Thies – the dominance of office over policy motives 
in the Italian party system: Italian parties show poor cohesion, members of parliament 
are only interested in “benefits for their constituencies, and [in] resources for their 
personal electoral machines and their faction’s organization” (Hine 1993: 171), most 
legislation is narrow ‘special interest legislation’ (leggine), and undersecretaries are a 
“convenient currency with which to gratify deputies and buy loyalty” (Dogan, quoted 
in Mershon 1999: 66); in particular they do not possess any substantial policy influ-
ence (Calandra 2002: 72–73). Moreover, according to a long-established “informal 
division of labour an undersecretary is left free to distribute the patronage of the min-
istry in his constituency” (Allum, quoted in Mershon 1996: 544; cf. Marradi 1982), a 
motive which would explain a high degree of mutual ‘shadowing’ among partners of a 
coalition (or between factions of a hegemonic party) without politicians needing to 
follow policy-control motives.11 
4 Conclusion 
When parties of a coalition government distribute portfolios among themselves, what 
exactly is it that they distribute: office rewards or institutional guarantees to influence 
future policies in a given jurisdiction? Current strands of coalition theory most often 
simply assume that the one or the other motive prevails. Scholars have paid little at-
tention to the question of whether different theoretical assumptions about the under-
lying motives of parties or politicians have similar or differing empirical implications. 
This has led them to cite exactly the same empirical evidence in support of their op-
posing theories. In this paper we have identified instances where office and policy 
assumption of coalition theory do indeed translate into different empirical expecta-
                                                        
11 Similar reservations could be formulated for Thies’s other positive case, Japan (not analyzed 
in our study), given that a large country literature sees the LDP habatsu as “exclusively office-
driven actors” (Bouissou 2001: 596 and passim; cf. Ramseyer/McCall-Rosenbluth 1993; Cox/
Rosenbluth 1996). Very similar to the Italian case, the pattern of position allotment in Japan is 
described by Bouissou as primarily driven by a “deep-rooted clientelism” (Bouissou 2001: 
587). LDP factions are eager to occupy political sub-spaces in order to deliver “posts, prestige 
and money” to their constituencies (587–588) and, in order to ensure that government posi-
tions were “just numbers in the arithmetic of internal party politics, posts were also deprived 
of almost all decision making power” (ibid.: 598). Again, purely office-driven parties or party 
factions would also have an interest in maximizing the number of political ‘sub-spaces’. In 
particular, they would all have an interest in being represented in the same pork-rich minis-
tries, which would produce a pattern of mutual ‘shadowing’ without shadowing being the in-
tention of the political actors. 
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tions. This allows us, we claim, to discriminate empirically and within a comparative 
framework between office and policy motives, an approach which is understood to be 
complementary to the valuable country case studies in which the relative importance 
of policy versus office-seeking motives has been mainly studied so far (see the contri-
butions in Müller/Strøm1999). 
Obviously, a neat separation between office and policy motives can only be made ana-
lytically, whereas these motives always mix in the real world to some extent. Yet, cas-
ual empiricism suggests that the mixtures themselves are not identical across parties 
and across party systems: there can be no doubt that, say, Swedish parties differ in 
behavior and motivation from, say, their Italian counterparts. In this paper we have 
been able to back this casual empiricism with systematic evidence derived from the 
analysis of portfolio allocation in Western coalition governments from 1949 to 2004. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that national party systems vary quite significantly 
with respect to the dominance of either policy or office motives. The findings of our 
study found solid support when checked against the expert survey results of Laver/
Hunt (1992) and are in broad agreement with the country literature. We infer that 
different strands of coalition theory obviously are more or less suited to different 
countries. 
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Appendix 
Description of variables  
Government seats Parties’ parliamentary seats as a share of all government parties’ seats 
Shapley Shapley value; calculated as share of all possible coalition permutations in 
which the respective party is decisive in terms of generating the absolute 
parliamentary majority (N /2 + 1) 
Coalition size Number of governing parties 
∆ # Government parties Change in the number of governing parties 
% Change of cabinet size Relative change of overall number of cabinet posts 
∅ D1a 
∅ C I |Ø D1| – |Ø D2| 
a The division by two is necessary in order to obtain easily interpretable index values and to avoid ac-
counting for both over- and under-representation. One could imagine that the resulting sum of absolute 
deviations from the ‘Gamson line’ is the share of disproportionally distributed ministers. To put it differ-
ently: It quantifies the share of ministers that would have to change their party affiliation in order to 
distribute the offices proportionally. The corrective impact measures the decline or increase of non-
proportionality between first order and second order distribution. 
Data sources 
Parliamentary seats Mackie /Rose 1991; Data Yearbooks of the 
European Journal of Political Research (EJPR) 
 
Composition of governments (various sources) 
Luxembourg <http: / /www.gouvernement.lu /gouvernement /gouvernements_precedents />, 
20 November 2003 
Netherlands <http: / /www.parlement.com>, 17 November 2003 
Norway <http: / /odin.dep.no / smk /engelsk / regjeringen / tidl_regjeringer>, 24 November 
2003 
Finland <www.vnk.fi / vn / liston>, 17 November 2003 
Austria <www.austria.gv.at / regierung / reg45.htm>, Archiv der Gegenwart and various  
sources 
Germany Archiv der Gegenwart, EJPR, Müller / Strøm 
Portugal Müller / Strøm, EJPR 
Italy Müller / Strøm, EJPR, Woldendorp, 
<http: / /www.palazzochigi.it /Governo /Governi>, 20 November 2003 
Belgium Müller / Strøm, Archiv der Gegenwart, 
<http: / /www.crisp.be /Documents-ref /Gouvernements.htm>, 1 December 2003 
Ireland Mershon, Archiv der Gegenwart, <http: / /www.taoiseach.gov.ie />, 27 November 
2003; <http: / /www.stormcentre.net /elections /people />, 27 November 2003 
France  Keesings Contemporary Archive, Woldendorp, <http: / / recherche.assemblee-
nationale.fr />, 15 December 2003; <http: / / francepolitique.free.fr>, 2 December 
2003; <http: / /www.georges-pompidou.org /epoque /gvnmt_cabinets /> 4 Decem-
ber 2003 
Sweden Sveriges Statskalender, various years 
<http: / /www.sweden.gov.se / systemofgov /governments />, 4 December 2003 
Australia <http: / /www.aph.gov.au / library /handbook /historical /ministries / index.htm>, 
27 November 2003 
Denmark Müller / Strøm, EJPR 
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